maj Juha Kukkola, D.Mil.Sc., Assistant Military Professor, Russia Research Group, Finnish National Defence University

This text is based on continuous monitoring of the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine conducted by the author. The sources are omitted for reasons of clarity and readability.

This text discusses the adaptation of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine on tactical, operational, and operational-strategic and strategic levels. What I mean by Russia’s adaptation in Ukraine is taken from Frank Hoffman’s book Mars Adapting. According to Hoffman, militaries change by adjusting, adapting, and innovating. The difference between these concepts is that adjustment is merely switching between existing competencies; adaptation is “the alteration of existing competencies at either the institutional or operational level, to enhance performance based on perceived gaps or deficiencies generated by combat experience during wartime”; and innovation is the evolution of new means and methods (new competencies).[1] Because the difference between adaptation and innovation can in practise be arguably hazy, I will use the term adaptation when referring to the changes in the Russian way of warfare from tactical to strategic level.

For Hofman, adaptation requires learning. However, when we consider the Russian case of adaptation in the war in Ukraine in particular, we must ask yourselves, is what we are seeing adaptation i.e. true learning or just change because of some other reasons; are Russians learning or just reacting; are the Russians showing true flexibly or just twisting under force – so to speak; and are the changes progressive and effective or backward looking and limited in their efficiency?

My main arguments in this text are, firstly, that there are strong continuities in the Russian way of warfare, and also institutional interests and external factors in play, that affect the Russian adaptation. Secondly, the Russian Armed Forces have a tendency to learn from historical examples (which might not always be detrimental). And thirdly, the main emphasis of adaptation and even innovation has been on the technical-tactical level. This is a Russian type of adaptation – Not necessarily inefficient or bad but simply different from Western armies.

Considering Russian adaptation on technical and tactical level, what have we seen in the past year (from spring 2023 to spring 2024)? On the Ukrainian front Russia has abandoned Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) and reverted to using infantry storm battalions, mechanized breakthrough units and line battalions in regiment or brigade formations – suitable to be used on the Ukrainian fields and plains. Main type of attack is either slow and shallow infantry assault or fast mechanized assaults seeking tactical penetration of defence lines and deployment of infantry. Infantry advances on foot, motorbikes, or light unarmoured vehicles or inside tanks and BMPs with heavy extra armour. Russian defence is based regimental defence zones where battalions are rotated. There are usually three lines of defence in depth of 20–40 km with additional fortifications around key points of terrain which is very similar to Soviet doctrine.

Drone warfare has become an essential part of the war in Ukraine. Russia has caught up Ukraine’s initial advantage in drone warfare and is now massively deploying small, commercial type drones and loitering munitions in tactical depth. Drones are used in integrated fashion (to support each other) and their use to support combined arms operations is developing. There is increasing evidence of Unmanned Ground Vehicles being used for combat missions, mining, logistics, and evacuation. The deployment of short-range electronic warfare assets has increased in tandem with the use of drones. EW systems are being integrated into assault vehicles and on platoon/squad level on the frontlines. These kinds of systems are flexible and do not provide vulnerable costly targets to enemy counteractions – unlike, for example, the Krasukha-4 system. Moreover, Russians seem to have increased their electronic warfare deconfliction capabilities at least on the tactical level.

Russia has used attack helicopters to support defensive battles but mainly relied on attack aircrafts to support its own offensives. The development and deployment of 250 to 1500 kg glide bombs or kits (FAB-UMPK/UMBP) launched from Su-24s, Su-34s and Su-35s at the distance of 40-70 km has had a marked effect on the battlefield for example in Avdiivka direction. However, Russia’s use of this kind of bombing from above territory it controls has been possible because of its strong integrated air defence system and therefore Ukraine’s current inability to strike the bombers. The bombs and tactics are based on old concepts that have now been used on a large scale and with better fire-control.

On a tactical level Russian solutions have mostly been conflict and situation specific. Development has been affected by operational and strategic enabling and restricting factors like Russia’s failures in joint operations and manoeuvre warfare, limited manpower, the possibility to replace equipment losses from storages, and strategic “procurement” from, for example, China and North-Korea. Also, pure survival instinct, ad hocism, voluntarism, grassroots activism, cultural issues, and business ‘possibilities’ have all affected tactical level adaptation. In fact, much of what has been described above is only adjustment, according to Hofman. And many adjustments have proven ineffective at least until now. Still, new infantry tactics with drone usage are a clear example of adaptation in the face of enemy action – as has been the way in which Russia has built its effective defensive posture.

On an operational level Russia has been unable to conduct deep, operational penetration and envelopment operations. Instead, from autumn 2023 it has conducted continuous, shallow tactical (partly mechanized) offensives in an opportunistic fashion – sometimes more because of political imperatives than operational reasons. Russia has usually pursued offensives in only one or two directions either consistently towards some operational-strategic objective or opportunistically when Ukrainian defences have faltered. Coordination of fires with attacking and defensive units has clearly improved – as have defensive logistics. However, Russia still seems to struggle with logistic support to offensive units. This might have more to do with weather and ground conditions and ever-present Ukrainian drones than Russian capabilities and doctrine.

Offensive operations have been tasked to special units which have often been moved behind the lines, in secrecy, from one direction to another. These units are probably specially trained for offensive missions. Sometimes, units have been deployed straight from the training centres to offensive operations as probably happened in the Kharkov assault in May 2023. However, attaining surprise, mass and speed has rarely been achieved. Semi-independent Private Military Companies (PMCs) like Wagner have been replaced by Z-battalions or penal battalions which have been used in high casualty infantry attacks. PMCs themselves have become extensions of the armed forces and have faded from the public eye.

Despite seemingly continuous tactical offensives, Russia’s main force has been on the defensive and its order of battle – with divisions and regiments assigned sectors to defend – has reflected this.  On an operational level much emphasis has been put on defence of the military forces, logistics, and the captured areas. Russia has adapted its force protection and measures to protect critical assets to Ukraine’s new weapon systems. Russia has been able to create and maintain an impressive integrated air defence system over its frontlines although rear areas have been less well protected. Moreover, it has been able to use EW systems to create large areas where the guidance systems of Western munitions and missiles have been heavily hampered, and the use of satellite communications restricted. Russia has thus developed a working doctrine for aerospace and electromagnetic domain defence – for this war.

Adaptation on a tactical level has not transformed into operational performance. On an operational level there have been some attempts at achieving surprise, but the results have been poor. Russia has been unable to build mass and speed for breakthrough attacks – although it is not clear if it even tries to achieve that. Russia has not substantially succeeded in increasing its performance through operational level adaptation. Losses have been high, much time has been spent, and achievements on the ground have been limited.

On an operational-strategic level, that is on the level of the Joint Grouping of Forces in Ukraine, the initial intent to capture Ukraine’s state apparatus with a surprise attack, evolved into an effort to destroy Ukraine’s armed forces in Donbass direction in the summer 2022. When that failed and after Russia warded off Ukraine’s counterattack, Russia began to conduct multiple parallel unbroken operations along the front line with the objective of capturing new territories and wearing out Ukrainian forces. Many of these operations have had more political than military logic behind them – although the same can be said of Ukrainian operations.

Russia has refuted pre-war ideas of a fragment battlefield where units were supposed to fight independently with no clear frontlines. Defensive fortifications have been built along the whole front and in operational depth. Offensive operations have been launched and fed from behind defensive lines which cover land, air, and electromagnetic domains. Because these offensives have not been enough to weaken Ukraine’s will to resist, to make its economy unviable, and to hinder its ability to create new forces, a new long-term strike campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure was launched in the autumn of 2023 and is still ongoing. This long-term campaign consists of integrated use of large amounts of long range-drones, cruise and ballistic missiles with effects-based targeting (most visibly against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure) – and of some purely, almost impulsive, retaliatory strikes to punish Ukraine for some attacks on the Russian homeland.

The special nature of the ‘Special military operation’ is still negatively affecting Russia’s command and control. Although the collection of Operational Strategic Commands from different Military Districts is morphing into a functional Joint Grouping of Forces command, the command structure is probably still inefficient and suffers from internal conflicts and stove piping. There is a shortage of competent high-level commanders after the losses of 2022–2023. Moreover, politically motivated corruption investigations and the current ‘purge’ in the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Armed Forces will surely affect the command of the operation. Then there is the establishment of the new Moscow and Leningrad military districts and the subordination of the Black Sea Fleet to the Navy Main Command which will surely affect the force generation and command of the Joint Grouping of Forces in Ukraine.

Because of Ukraine’s drone and missile strikes, the Black Sea Fleet has basically been withdrawn to secure ports and now functions as a missile launching platform and as an extra ferrying capacity. Mining operations have been, probably for political reasons, restricted. Naval blockade against Ukraine failed. The Russian air force has been delegated to air defence and support roles almost from the beginning of the operation. However, its role has fluctuated depending on the overall balance of power and the introduction of new weapon systems. Currently, the redeployment of air defence assets to protect strategic objects is getting critical as Ukraine continues to strike against oil refineries and other industries.

Russia has continued to develop and use indirect and non-military means, but information warfare, economic pressure, assassinations, sabotage, and subversion operations have had limited effect. Much of that is thanks to the work of Ukrainian counterintelligence, Ukraine’s resilience, and probably Western support. However, Russia’s tactical-operational espionage capabilities have been improving continuously which will help Russia’s information operations and hinder Ukraine’s deception efforts. Russian cyber operations are evolving to continuous cyber-based influencing and destabilization operations in which the use of proxies has become normal. The ability to conduct destructive cyber-attacks together with kinetic strikes against critical infrastructure targets is certainly a capability that the Russians try to achieve. Still, as Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure continues to degrade, so do the direct and collateral effects of cyber-attacks.  

Thus, on an operational-strategic level Russia is fighting in multiple operational directions and in all domains and aiming for continuous destabilization and wearing out of Ukrainian forces to support a strategy of attrition. Clearly, the use of Operational Strategic Commands in an out-of-area operation did not deliver, so there is probably a search going on for a future alternative command system. Although we have not seen World War II type front operations, they are not impossible if the correlation of forces changes. Integration of indirect and non-violent means is ongoing but their effects (which were supposed to be decisive) have not corresponded to the ideas of Russian military academics. There is a lot of continuity on the operational-strategic level. The most visible adaptation has been the defensive posture, which is, however, an application of pre-war doctrine.

Lastly, on a strategic level Russia has abandoned its strategy of indirect actions which was supposed to bring victory with minimal costs. It has adopted a strategy of attrition which will have higher costs but will also bring legitimacy to the Russian regime by partly forcing and partly enticing the whole economy and society to take part in the war. Ongoing semi-mobilization is becoming the defining characteristic of the Russian state. This kind of power arrangement between the state, military, and society has deep roots in tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. Society’s willingness to bear costs and suffer losses in the name of some nationalistic ideals, in face of state oppression, and in hope of economic benefits is a recurrent theme of Russian history. However, Putin’s regime tries to limit losses or shift them to certain units/groups – it has learned from the civil resistance to the autumn 2022 mobilization and Prigozhin’s mutiny. Despite optimistic declarations, the Russian Armed Forces has significant recruitment problems. The type of war Russia is fighting requires troops willing to or forced to take significant risks, and money cannot indefinitely buy loyal and competent fighters. Reliance on punishment battalions or ethnic groups creates unhealthy practices and corruption.

Russia’s defence expenditure for 2024 is approximately 6 percent of the GDP, 109 $ billion, or almost 30 percent of budget expenses. In addition to providing the Armed Forces equipment and ammunition, the reinvigorated defence industry, and import substitution practices, provide an alternative for much needed economic reforms. They enable the continuing dependence on hydrocarbons, protection of internal markets from competition, and provide jobs for almost every citizen. However, industry cannot provide everything that is needed by the fighting forces, so adaptation on the field is always restricted by what the Russian defence industry is able and willing to produce. Moreover, the ever-present corruption creates friction and affects what the troops really receive on the battlefield.

As Russia’s military is becoming ever more reliant on foreign technology and supplies, ensuring the support of foreign states is becoming critical. The military requires dual-use civilian technologies, the state needs income from exports, and internal regime support relies on civilian luxury and common goods imports. This dependency imposes restrictions on Russia’s strategy. Putin must listen to China’s leader Xi Jinping, and support North-Korea and Iran in their political manoeuvres. It cannot just coerce Turkey, Central-Asian or Caucasian countries because they would restrict Russian import flows. Russia’s freedom of action on the international stage is restricted and relies much on countries which it previously courted but tried to keep at arm’s length.

While the Kremlin is playing this political game, the Russian Armed Forces are redefining the character of future war and thus the missions, organization, and capabilities of the future Russian armed forces. The Russian view of future war has become hazy. Thus, it is safe, but not so insightful, to argue that Russia will either over-learn from the war in Ukraine, dismiss it as an anomaly, or find a balance between its experiences in Ukraine and the forecasts of the future. Based on what Russians and Soviets have written and done before, I would argue that the new forces are being built to resolve the current war but also to prepare for the next. Technological and doctrinal visionary development is subordinate to the current needs but also to the reconstruction of the conventional deterrence and to a possible (but not desired) war with NATO, and to resolving local conflicts. Russia has always prepared to fight different types of conflict in multiple directions, and this will not change. At the moment, it also seems that the relationship between the Kremlin, the security services, the Armed Forces and Rosgvardiya will remain the same.

Although Russia has chosen the strategy of attrition it is still conducting strategic level indirect actions. The evolving information operation directed towards Ukraine’s allies and neutrals aims to degrade support to Ukraine and to protect Russia’s own information space. The latter includes the increasingly strong Political Directorate of the MoD which educates Russian soldiers, and the youth, to fear and hate ‘the enemy.’ Attacks against Western infrastructure, recruitment of spies, saboteurs and useful idiots, use of international institutions to put pressure on Western interests, and covert operations in Africa have increased. Russia has hedged its bets on the tried-and-true weaponization of immigration and has raised questions about border arrangements with its small neighbours. Russia continuously alters its nuclear and cyber signalling to the current situation to try limit Western support for Ukraine, to keep Western forces out of Ukraine, and to protect its own assets and citizens from the war. The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons into Belarus is part of adapting Russia’s nuclear deterrence posture to the new situation – as is the deployment of anti-satellite weapons into space.

Currently, Russia’s strategy towards Ukraine is the subjugation of Ukraine, but Russia’s freedom of action is restricted for internal and external reasons. For Russia, war has become the “new normal”– and Russia is changing itself to accommodate it. By doing so it is borrowing much from history but is still trying to fit what it has to the current situation with one eye on the future. On a strategic level Russia’s adaptation has been most visible on the economic front. Otherwise, there is a clear sense of continuity, of borrowing from history, and altering the use of competencies Russia already had in its disposal before the war.

To conclude, it can be argued that adaptation on lower levels is affected by higher level effects and visa-a-versa. Russian technical and tactical level adaptation is very much dependent on the Russian economy, civil-military relations, and massive stockpiles of Soviet era equipment. On operational and operational-strategic level Russia has built strong defences on captured territories because this is something it has resources and knowhow for, and what its forces can do – and have done historically. New organizations and capabilities have been created for offensive operations; this is something that Russia managed to do already in the Chechen wars, but poor quality of troops and restrictions based on Russia’s internal issues have hindered conceptual and actual effective breakthroughs. Deception and surprise have been unachievable because Russia has been unable to adapt to the modern transparent battlefield – perhaps because its training system does not produce creative enough officers or because it has continuously underestimated and misunderstood its opponent. On a strategic level Russia adopted the strategy of attrition because the logic of the ‘special military operation’ restricted the full mobilization of the Russian state, and the restrictions placed on Russia by its other international level interests, like China-relations, demanded it.

By observing the Russian example, we can argue that the rate of adaptation – the alteration of existing competencies, capabilities, or ways of acting – during wartime is somewhere between three to six months at the tactical level. This is the rate where modified systems, organizations, or ways of fighting or operating have appeared on the battlefield and have started to have an effect. In this conflict, strategic level adaptation has taken from six months to a year. This rate has been enough to enable Russia to continue its war-effort, but it has not enabled it to overcome Ukraine. Moreover, many (not all) adaptation efforts seem to have been based on survival and linear counteractions to enemy actions or own deficiencies more than systematic analysis of weaknesses and finding innovative and effective solutions.

What is still under the shadow of the future, is how transferable or persistent – or even effective some of the changes in the Russian Armed Forces will be. As we do not have a clear view on what is happening inside the Russian Armed Forces, we can only guess at the effects of service branch culture or inertia, conflicting organizational interests, and economic limitations on the adaptation and innovation happening. Thus, as we look at the Russian adaptation in the War in Ukraine there are somethings we can see, much we can guess, and even more that we do not yet know anything about.

[1] Hoffman, Frank G.: Mars Adapting: Military Change During War. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2021, p. 7.

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