by Oona-Maaria Hyppölä, researcher, Russia Research-Group, Finnish National Defence University
This blog post is based on an on-going research conducted by the author as part of “The Evolving Relationship Between the Russian Armed Forces and the Society” -project at the FNDU. The sources are omitted for reasons of clarity and readability.
Russia employs a mixed military manpower system combining mandatory conscription with voluntary contract service. This hybrid model aims to maintain a standing army of professional soldiers supported by a large, supposedly well-trained reserve. However, Russia continues to face persistent challenges in effectively sustaining such a system. The ongoing war has exacerbated this difficulty even further, as Russia has to address acute manpower shortages and frontline needs. This urgency has led to hasty, short-sighted political decisions and an increase in control measures, rather than developing the system with a long-term perspective. Additionally, the already existing general societal reluctance to perform military service in Russia and the unwillingness to participate directly in Kremlin’s war efforts, further complicates the situation.
Recurring Challenges of the Mixed Military Service System
Although conscription in Russia is a constitutional duty for the men, that is, theoretically mandatory and general, in practice, it is a highly selective system. Only roughly around 10% to maximum 30% of draf-aged men are actually summoned, with most men avoiding it through official deferrals and exemptions, or through unofficial means like bribes. This results in a socio-economic disparity where primarily working-class men from remote regions fill the ranks. This disparity has been even more pronounced amidst the war.
Another inherent issue of the military service system in Russia is the quality of the military training itself. Despite years of long-standing reform efforts, improvements in the quality of service conditions and training have been partial at best. Although the quality of training and conditions has improved in some units, conscripts in other garrisons still reportedly experience poor conditions, where the environment is more akin to a labor camp, where conscripts are to perform idle maintenance and construction work with little to nothing to do with meaningful military training. The system is therefore highly unequal in terms of where one happens to serve.
Russia has been gradually transitioning towards a system that would reduce reliance on conscripts and shift the focus more towards professional, specialised units since the establishment of its modern armed forces in the 1990s. Significant resources have been directed in developing the contract soldier system especially during the past 20 years – first, under Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov and the ‘New Look’ overhaul, and then during Sergei Shoigu’s tenure. These reforms managed to achieve some successes, such as enhancing the army’s public image and increasing soldiers’ salaries and social benefits. However, the military has constantly struggled with meeting recruitment targets and retaining soldiers, even well before the war with Ukraine.
Past military reforms have failed to put emphasis on the more intangible factors – such as, service conditions, command and control, quality of training, service motivation. Instead the focus has been on technological modernisation, material aspects, and at least in human resource management – quantity over quality. Sustainable change has failed largely due to deeply rooted systemic issues such as persistent corruption, lack of political accountability in implementing promised changes, and the absence of any real oversight and evaluation mechanisms.
Current Challenges Amidst the War
Russia’s launch of a full-scale war has undoubtedly aggravated existing issues in its military manpower system. Recruitment and retention problems have intensified, leading to increased draft evasion and the government’s hasty and harsh measures to enforce enlistment. The contract soldier system, originally intended to enhance professionalism, now functions more as a desperate mobilisation tool. Reportedly inadequate training and equipment, as well as unlawful deployments of even newly-appointed conscripts to combat zones, have caused social unrest within Russian society. Although the direct impact on political decision-making is questionable, this has nevertheless taken a toll on the military’s reputation and created additional problems for the government to address while trying to keep its war machine running.
Additionally, the high salaries promised to contract soldiers are a significant financial burden for the state. Maintaining these payments and the level of salaries is crucial for keeping the recruitment running and to ensure social stability, but eventually it is an unsustainable and financially unbearable system to uphold. Moscow has attempted to shift more responsibility for organising and funding recruitment to the regions, but ultimately, all challenges faced by Russia’s military machine will boomerang back to Moscow. Moreover, Russia faces a grave dual dilemma – the shortage of working-age men both on the home front and the front lines. This demographic issue is becoming even more severe as the war continues.
The recent involvement of North Korean soldiers in the war seems like a dire yet pragmatic solution for Russia to address its personnel shortages. By using North Korean soldiers, Russia avoids the responsibility of compensations and dealing with their deaths, which presumably do not significantly concern the Russian or international public, for that matter. However, using foreign fighters, especially with significant casualties, could lead to post-war repercussions. Russia has ratified a ‘strategic partnership treaty’ with North Korea, envisioning mutual military assistance. Yet, official statements have been vague about all alleged military aid from North Korea, especially regarding the deployment of North Korean troops, neither directly admitting nor denying it. The use of direct foreign assistance in Russia’s war efforts appears to be a politically sensitive issue for the Kremlin, requiring careful rhetorical framing, especially if this war is to be portrayed as the next Great Patriotic War.
Future Postbellum Challenges
While the ongoing war undoubtedly demands immediate solutions, strategic planning beyond the current conflict is essential. The current war is a protracted war of attrition, but it is not an eternal war and was definitely never planned as such. In other words, not all investments and objectives in developing the military in Russia can be tied to winning at this war. Thus, the end of the war will be the main acid test for Russia – for the political regime, military as an institution, and the society at large. It is after the war, the state leadership must address key questions directly impacting the future of the armed forces, the credibility of Russia’s future conventional deterrence and internal cohesion of the country. The most pressing issues facing the Russian leadership after the war concerning its army are:
Veteran Reintegration: How will the state handle the men returning home, in need of serious rehabilitation and support? Many people have seen their income level rise because of this war with generous payments and salaries for contract soldiers and defense industry workers. A potential escalation of social problems is possible if income levels collapse post-war, while inflation continues to rise, and if, despite political promises, the veterans of this war are not greeted with parades and benefits. Additionally, failure to provide adequate governmental support could potentially lead to societal discontent and domestic instability.
Mobilisation and Reserve System: The quality and efficiency of Russia’s mobilisation and reserve system need improvements. The current war has drastically showcased deficiencies in refresher training and readiness, which must be addressed to maintain a credible defense. The credibility of deterrence and the true state of an army are reflected in the quality and capabilities of its reserves, especially in a mass army like Russia is maintaining. Despite having an operable training system in tehory and a large number of men on paper, years of neglect have resulted in substandard reserves lacking essential skills. Additionally, the chaotic partial mobilisation campaign and recurring recruitment issues exposed critical shortages in the mobilisation system marked by bureaucratic inefficiencies, equipment and logistical deficiencies, and inadequate preparation.
Meaningful Professionalism and Military Reforms: Professionalism in the military context ought to encompass more than just receiving a high salary. How is Russia planning to truly invest in advanced skills, discipline, and commitment of its soldiers? Investing in non-material aspects such as training and education, command and control, and motivation is essential for a truly professional military. Yet, sustainable changes require addressing systemic issues like corruption, lack of political accountability, and ineffective oversight. The current use of the contract soldier system as merely a mobilisation tool, producing quantity over competence, undermines the very concept of professionalism within the Russian armed forces.
Conclusion
In a state of active war, time and resources are a scarcity, and investing in long-term strategic level efforts and quality of the military is undoubtedly more easily said than done. While the importance of non-material factors for military efficiency is understood in Russia, achieving sustainable change would require political will, and will within the military establishment, to commit to transforming existing structures. That said, wars tend to serve as natural catalysts for military reform. Only time will tell if Russia emerges from this war with a more capable and trained army or reverts to a mass force relying purely on numbers. One thing is for certain – as the population and general willingness to serve are on decline, it will take considerable time for the Russian army to recover its full strength from the impacts of this war. The damage to Russia’s military manpower system, to the credibility of the army’s professional military capabilities, and to its deterrent effect appears to be long-lasting.
Russian Military and Security Research Group 