Lt Col Antti Vasara, Finnish Defence Command Training Division

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to provide a brief overview of reflexive control theory and to discuss different ways of countering Russia’s information influence activities during the conflict and beyond. The article is based on my previous research[i]  on Russian theory of reflexive control and subsequent analysis of the theory and its application conducted by an American military officer, John Merriam published[ii] in 2023.

Background

In my research, I present the following starting points which are previously used in the Soviet Union and Russia, as definitions of reflexive control:

Lefebvre (1962): ”one side of the conflict gets an advantage if it has information on the situational awareness of the adversary and the knowledge of how the opposing side plans to use its own doctrine to solve the situation at hand. In this case, it is possible to form an equation of the perceived alternatives in decision making.”

Leonenko (1995): ” Reflexive control consists of such motives and grounds transferred by the ruling system unto the governed system, which bring about the desired decision. The aim of reflexive control is to cause the adversary to make a decision unfavourable to him. Naturally, one has to understand how the adversary thinks.”

Makhnin (2012): ”reflexive control of the adversary is an activity where by feeding selected information one impedes the adversary’s ability to utilize success, the adversary is forced to abandon his original plan and make irrational decisions.”

In my research I developed a twofold model of reflexive control that was based on research literature on reflexive control theory from the 1960s until the present day. The twofold model aims to cover entire the process of reflexive control from implementation to results, following the strategic framework of the Ends, Ways and Means -model conceptualised by Arthur Lykke (Lykke 1989). Fundamental to this model is its division into two approaches in accordance with the ideas of Lefebvre and Makhnin: the constructive or creative way, in which the methods are used to lead the adversary into making the desired decisions, and the destructive way, in which the methods weaken and disrupt the adversary’s decision-making (Ways). These factors are brought together in the model with the aim of trying to illustrate which part of the military command system is targeted (Ends).

Basic Assumptions on Reflexive Control in Russia

The basic premises of reflexive control and Russian strategy (or the lack thereof) are the following:

  1. There is a systemic approach in Russia to recognised problems. The problems cannot be solved without considering how the the overall system behind it works and how the system utilises the information it receives.
  2. All activity is guided by a combination of military and non-military means. the military means do not exist in a vacuum, but are an integral part of the chosen operational model. War is not a continuation of politics by other means. Instead, a selection of various means of war are constantly used and the observations guide the selection of one’s own operating models. It is more likely that actions are guided by a plan than that a plan does not exist.
  3. For a long time in military doctrine and systemic level, there has been an attempt to integrate  realistic evalution and anticipation of the adversary’s actions into one’s own command and decision making processes. An ”enemy” operating model is built into the command system and decision-making models, which is then used when making alternative plans. These models are utilised at all command levels from strategic to tactical.
  4. Tradition of dialectics: all phenomena in the world are a  struggle between two related forces, which can be analysed and objectified. Emotionsor unexplainable ”fortune” has no part in dialectics.

Based on these thoughts, I concluded in my research that it does not seem credible that the actions of the Russian leadership are based on mere opportunism. It seems more plausible that there is an attempt to hide the higher level strategy, so that its implementation is not exposed to actions such as reflexive control by the adversary.

Further Research on Reflexive Control

The insights I developed in my research have been further developed in a study written by an American officer John Merriam as part of his Master’s level studies at the U.S. Army War College. In an article published in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies,  Merriam has raised the following inbuilt attributes of reflexive control that can be utilised to inhibit and undermine it.

Firstly, reflexive control requires that  Russian information warfare (utilisation of information) is succesful. According to the Russian perspective, information warfare is holistic, unified and continuous. The holistic approach to information warfare combines the physical effects with the cognitive and psychological effects. The unified approach synchronises all of the available methods  – military/kinetic, diplomatic and informational and directs their effects on the adversary’s entire system, onto both military and non-military elements. The continuous element of Russian information warfare is that it is not happening potentially in the future, but rather that it is  continuous and on-goingall, regardless of the existence of a military conflict.

Secondly, Merriam suggests that the real usability of reflexive control requires a response and feedback so that the observations can be connected to the following actions. Thus, according to Merriam,  acting in an unexpected way or denying feedback could prevent reflexive control plans. This may partly be the case, yet it is worth noting that the original theory of reflexive control specifically states that feedback is not necessary for the implementation of the action. Hence, Merriam’s statement is not fully compliant with the theory, but has certainly some truth to it.

Merriam agrees with the idea presented earlier by Timothy Thomas and many others, that for reflexive control to work, it requires long-term actions and secrecy of the plan. The main obstacle for effectivness of reflexive control is that the plan is exposed and that the target takes actions that are counter to Russia’s interests. According to Merriam and others, it is quite easy to ward off reflexive control once it is revealed. No doubt this is ture, butthe challenge is to expose the actions.

As the main idea of his article, Merriam presents four means   by which reflexive control can be made more difficult and one’s own freedom of decision-making can be retained. Next, I will look the four means presented by Merriam from my own perspective, while aiming to answer the questions raised by Merriam in his own research. My perspective is purely Finnish.

Number One – Concealing the Target

According to Merriam, Western countries must make it more difficult for Russia to interpret and understand our own information ”filters”. As Timothy Thomas has argued  (quoting researchers from the Soviet era), the first task of reflexive control is to find the weak point of the ”filters” (including preferences, tendencies, doctrine, technical capabilites) and exploit it. Merriam recognises that Western doctrine is widely shared and thus, can be assumed that it is also known to Russia. Concealing it is no longer possible in the modern world, but Merriam questions whether it is really necessary for Western military and strategic decision-makers to be constantly present on social media. Transparency and openess are an integral part of western democratic decision-making. However, is it necessary to share more information about oneself than is truly needed to accomplish the mission at hand? Every post we publish and message we send about ourselves also uncovers our own world view and psychological profile – do we really want provide all this information to those who are opposed to our world view?

We do recognise that we are on thin ice if we start to outright lie in  information warfare, nor is it a western value. Western information operations and strategic communications do not use disinformation as part of their modus operandi. This is a key value that needs to be retained, especially when compared to Russia’s actions. Regardless of that, all actions that we can take to protect and conceal the factors behind our decision-making processes will contribute to preserving the independence of our own decision-making. Specifically regarding this, Merriam emphasises, that extensive exposure of Russian disinformation in Western social media plays an important role, and thus bringing Russia’s true intentions to the fore. The publicity of this action works against the goals of reflexive control.

Second – ”Finding” a Third Option

Merriam suggests that the concept of an adversary’s situational awareness and decision-making options that is built based on dialectic materialism and an objective model, and  which is used in reflexive control is, by itself, limited. If the Russian way of thinking suggests that by modeling the adversary’s decision-making one can also model the options available to the adversary, then according to Merriam this can be preventedby adding creativity and options into Western decision-making. Merriam sees several Russian actions as an example of this model , which  according to him, were aiming to test the responses,– for example, the tactical level actions in Ukraine in 2014–2015 or Russian strategic exercises to which NATO has responded according to its own strategy. As a solution to this, Merriam proposes wholly unpredictable actions, deriving an example from the Cuban embargo set by Kennedy and comparing it tothe current support to Ukraine that has been possiblewithout escalating the situation, while acting against Russia’s goals.

The Reflexive theory is indeed based on the model described above , where it is thought that the target has a limited number of options to choose from and that the aim is to guide the actions towards the desired way either constructively or destructively. Merriam’s idea of ”outside the box” -thinking is good in itself, yet slightly oversimplified. Indeed, a number of issues affecting  rational decision-making are subject to a very limited choice, at least in peacetime democracies. Thus, a completely asymmetrical response is difficult toachieve and at least a portion of the responses are highly predictable. The most crucial thing is to detect the easily predictable responses and the risks associated with them.

Exposing Disinformation and Understanding Information Vacuums

According to Merriam, one of Russia’s most important actions in modifying the information environment is increasing tensions in select areasor activities. Here, it would be essential to detect the ”information vacuums” – what is happening in the places where Russiadoes not  want us to look ? As per Merriam, it must be assumed  in all actions countering Russia that Russian communication and actions are predetermined and aimed at counting the Western freedom of action. Hostility and ”pressure” – ultimatums, threats, showcasing of cruelties and self-victimization – all are part of the reflexive control tool kit aiming to overburden  Western decision-making, limit the apparent options and shorten the time available for decision-making. The aim is to guide the decision-making to favoring Russia, by using all possible means.

Merriam showcases the Biden Administration’s way of publishing all information on Russian troop movements and attack preparations in 2022 as an effective hindrance to reflexive control actions. By publishing classified information, Russia was denied the useof excuses, and when the attack started it could be said that Russia had lied about  its own actions, while also being able to  verify the information that the Western media had partially questioned. Here I agree with Merriam – the Administration’s  actions at the end of 2021 and beginning of 2022 effectively prevented  successful Russian reflexive control, and for example Finland and Sweden were able to seek full NATO membership after the truth had beenrevealed, wholly contrary to Russia’s wishes. Hadthe intelligence information been declared classified and the attack preparations would not have been openly reported, Russia would have probably been able to  surprise in  Western decision-makers, and at least some of the politicians would have been hamstrung. In terms of succesful decision-making, the uncomfortable truth is better than not knowing.

Use of Reflexive Interaction – Redirecting Reflexive Control Againstthe  Adversary

According to Merriam, whendetecting a presumed Russian reflexive control operation, Western decision-makers should be able to utilise it against Russia. The model, based on interaction between  systems, gives the ”target system” the opportunity to utilise the detected control by concealing its observations and by preparing a counteractions In practise, the target system seeminglyproceeds along the desired path, yet in reality it utilises the information to weaken the enemy. As Merriam notes, Russian (and Soviet) theorists recognised this as the weak part of reflexive control. In Merriam’s view, the Western decision-makers should aim for more higher level reflection and by taking into account that the other party has in some way definedtheir response. As per Merriam, the cognitive psychologists studying reflexive games have found most of the responses correspond to ”zero-degree” reflexivity – that is, they do not take into account the other party’s most obvious responses. Merriam states, like other researchers of reflexive control, the one who can best foresee the adversary’s movements and take them into account in their own actions has the advantage.

I completely agree with Merriam on this, and that in our own actions we should always emphasize evaluating the adversary’s actions realistically, while taking into account the perceived goals. Having chosen an open doctrine and defensive warfare strategy, our own decision-making and the factors behind our decisons are easily evaluatedand this must be understood and utilised at all levels of wargaming from tactical to strategic. The element of surprise does not materialize simply by stating that the plan is based on surprise, but from having been able to evaluate the adversary’s goals based on their actions and by modelling what effect that has on our own systems. It not easy, but a zero-degree reflection cannot be the response.

Conclusion

As Merriam states in his article, reflexive control is an approach that includes manyrisks and potential for failure. As per reflexive control, an objectively false view of the operating environment can be created for the adversary by using a combination of constructive and destructive means. Its greatest challenge is the idea that I also presented in my own work, which is that by feeding the required information to the enemy, it will operate (almost always) in a predictable way. To some extent this has been true, but whenever Western decision-making has been able to act less predictably, the response has been more difficult to estimate and Russia has had more difficulty in attaining its goals. One must also recognise that a large part of Russia’s ”informational psychological operations” targets primarily itsinternal activities, and that its aim is to create an image of the enemy and maintain the idea of a continuous war between Russia and the West. So far, its success has been questionable to say the least.

Based on my own research, I argue that in Russian reflexive control, the reception of an individual message is less meaningful, but it is more essential to use multiple information channels simultaneously to push the distinctive narrative that aims to confuse the adversary’s decision-making and situational analysis. Similarly, it is important to keep in mind that countering reflexive control by simply stating the facts is not enough to derail an adversary’s predetermined action plan, since  the essential thing is to create multiple, possibly even contradictory “truths” instead of one. I still consider this point of view valid, and therefore it is effective to try andfind connections between things that turn out to be true in the midst of it all – often they are the things that Russia does not emphasize in its communications and combining them could reveal something about the true purpose of Russia’sactions.

It continues to be crucial for the Western countries to maintain openness, honesty and transparency in their own activities – this is the preferable way to countering the Russian narrative of continuous warfare. On the other hand, the past couple of years have certainly removed any illusions that  the aims of Russia’s current regime  areanything other than to continue and even deepen the conflict with the West. Therefore, concealing the details of our own decision-making and decision-makers more effectively may serve our own interests.

[i] Vasara (2019), Refleksiivisen kontrollin mallit ja vastustajan päätöksentekoon vaikuttaminen Venäjän sotaharjoituksissa 2010-luvulla, General Staff Officer Course final paper, National Defence University

[ii] John Merriam (2023) One Move Ahead — Diagnosing and Countering Russian Reflexive Control, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 36:1, pp. 1-27.

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