Jenni Kirkinen, BA, University of Helsinki

Introduction


The Russian foreign policy aims to change the current world order have not been well hidden in years. The last remnants of the façade were wiped away when Russia launched full-scale invasion in Ukraine in 2022. There has been consistent work and effort put to promote multipolarity as the new international world order through, for example, the promotion of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. The Russian Federation has in different channels spoken about the need for stronger protection of states (sovereignty) and this is achieved through internationally binding and respected legislation. The Russian Federal Assembly has been one of the key actors in the international field in promoting non-interference and stronger protection of states’ sovereignty. In 2016, the Russian Federal Council’s representative together with his Cypriot counterpart introduced a draft resolution “The role of parliament in preventing outside interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states” in the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). In this draft resolution, Russia and Cyprus outlined a grim-looking future for democracy from the Western point of view. In the draft they demand a new international observatory instrument to be established under the IPU, since the parliaments of states are responsible for protecting their citizens from foreign interference and, ultimately, protecting state sovereignty (IPU, C-I/136/DR, 2016). This resolution was not accepted as it was, but Russia’s policy goals have remained. In this short text, I will outline what Russia seeks to achieve with this emphasis on ‘foreign interference’ and what it tells about the overall objectives of Russia’s foreign policy.


The Federation Council shapes debate on harmful external ‘interference’


The Russian Federation established an “Interim Commission of the Federation Council for the Protection of State Sovereignty and Prevention of Interference in Russia’s Internal Affairs” in 2017 through the Federal Council (upper chamber of the Russian parliament). One of the main reasons listed for the establishment of such a Commission was to, firstly, improve Russian legislation and secondly, to retaliate against the United States’ discrimination of Russia and the detected attempts to interfere with Russian 2016 and 2017 elections (Federal Council December 25, 2017). This Commission has been producing annual reviews of interference in Russian national affairs by foreign states and consequently, policy recommendations of what ought to be done to counter those interferences. In February 2023, this Commission was made a permanent part of the Federal Council’s Commission structure. The Federal Council is responsible for the work of the Commission, but the bicameral Federal Assembly has not left the State Duma without a mission. The Duma has been active in tying bilateral relations with states belonging to the post-Soviet world and the so-called developing nations/countries. Furthermore, the Duma co-operates with many international assemblies and organises conferences. One example would be the December 2022 conference on “Eurasian Choice as a Basis for Strengthening Sovereignty.” The concepts which unify all these efforts are the constant promotion of non-interference and sovereignty.

How is non-interference then defined? The Commission defines it as any entity aiming to change the foundation of the Russian Federation´s constitutional system, territorial integrity, internal and external policy, or the structure of state and municipal governance (Federal Council 2018, 4). The IPU draft resolution did not have its definition for non-interference but referred to the United Nations Charter as the basis of such a definition. In the UN Charter, non-interference is defined in Article 2 (4) as simply respecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of states (United Nations 1945). Furthermore, it prohibits the use of threats and the use of force against other Members (United Nations 1945). The Commission refers to different international laws and treaties including the UN Charter and has claimed that the US and its allies have broken these agreements time after time while Russia has not engaged in similar endeavours (Federal Council 2020, 49). With this rhetoric, the Commission merely repeats typical Russian foreign policy parlance without adding anything original to it. However, the annual reports of the Commission present an interesting resource for analysing how Russia’s political elite defines threats towards Russia. The analysis of the material allows us to pinpoint who and what is affecting negatively Russian national security.


Definition of threats towards Russia


The Russian Federal Assembly and the President with his cabinet can draft and introduce laws and legislation in the Russian political system. With the aid of the Commission, these actors can respond to perceived threats and create legislature that limits foreign interference, but at the same time also limits the rights of Russian citizens. I will briefly analyse how the Commission has legitimatised its concerns of external threats in the framework of ‘non-interference’ as a concept.

Firstly, the main adversary through the years is the United States, but it doesn’t seem to pose a direct physical military threat. Moreover, the United States is discussed from a historical perspective and what it has done to countries outside of the Western world and Russia. NATO’s expansion is seen as something that Russia holds as a possible threat to its territorial integrity (Federal Commission 2018, 80). What Russia perceives as a real threat is the spread of Western ideology through the consumption of culture and the use of the internet (Federal Commission 2018, 22-4). Furthermore, economic sanctions policies and disruptions in cooperation in the fields of research and development are seen as a direct threat to the future of Russia (Federal Commission 2018, 63; 20). Additionally, the Commission has identified Western attempts to interfere in the Russian proclaimed fair and democratic elections. Of course, from the Western point of view, there is very little truth and fairness in Russia’s political and electoral systems, but this is what the Russian government claims. To protect Russia from these threats and attempts of interference, legislations that violate the universal human rights of Russian citizens and international agreements are being drafted. However, as mentioned, these acts are framed to protect Russia (Federal Council 2018, 75). This creates a vicious cycle of limiting the rights of the people while being on the “right side” of the law, since the actions are within the boundaries of national laws that the government gets to draft without any real opposition.

What kind of laws and policies have been made based on the Commissions suggestions then? For instance, the law outlining what “social networks” and “social network owners” and their responsibilities are came into being in 2021, after the process to draft such a law was started in 2017 from the suggestion of the Commission (Federal Commission 2021, 84). This law restricts how platforms such as Facebook and YouTube can work in Russia. Another example of the successful influence on law-making by the Commission is the amendment of law (327-FZ) “On mass media” Article 6 (Federal Commission 2019, 75). As the Commission had recognised that foreign media and foreign-funded Russian media disseminated harmful and anti-Russian content, laws became more restricted and made telecom and online information distributors store the personal data of their users on Russian soil (so-called Yarovaya law). Thus, the distributors of harmful content could be identified. The formal conceptual acceptance of interference in the 2020 constitution update could be seen as one of the milestones of the Commission’s work. The constitution now outlines in Article 791 that “the Russian Federation is taking measures to… prevent interference in internal affairs of the state” (Federal Council 2021, 81-2).

In Conclusion


One way to analyse and understand the Commission’s perception of threats in the annual reports, is to take a look at the theory of ontological security. Ontological security (in International Relations) aims to see what external factors make the “self” anxious or threaten its existence and how this is responded by governments of states (Kinvall and Mitzen 2020, 242-3). Based on the literature on ontology, it could be defined that Russian ontological security is derived from three main categories: imperial state identity, traditional values as cultural determinants, and economic-military development (Moulioukova & Kanet 2022). How this relates to the promotion of non-interference and national law-making should be studied further to make the connections clearer between protecting sovereignty and shifting world powers. Furthermore, this creation of a multipolar world order with Russian “rules of the game” will ultimately grant authoritarian governments the right to take control of their citizens and stop any democratisation efforts.

Sources:


“Chapter I: Purposes and Principles (Articles 1-2).” United Nations. June 26, 1945. Accessed March 14, 2023. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-1.

Federation Council. ”ЕЖЕГОДНЫЙ ДОКЛАД Временной комиссии Совета Федерации по защите государственного суверенитета и предотвращению вмешательства во внутренние дела Российской Федерации (февраль 2018 г.).”/ ANNUAL REPORT of the Interim Commission of the Federation Council for the Protection of State Sovereignty and Prevention of Interference in the Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (February 2018).” Commission materials, February 2018. Accessed March 14, 2023. http://council.gov.ru/media/files/G6hNGZ3VbQNiMdZki1BKbrsrvuRxPwim.pdf.

Federation Council. ”ЕЖЕГОДНЫЙ ДОКЛАД Временной комиссии Совета Федерации по защите государственного суверенитета и предотвращению вмешательства во внутренние дела Российской Федерации (30 мая, 2019 г.)”/ ANNUAL REPORT of the Interim Commission of the Federation Council for the Protection of State Sovereignty and Prevention of Interference in the Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (May 30, 2019)” Commission materials, May 30, 2019. Accessed March 14, 2023. http://council.gov.ru/media/files/LIkgU7Df0m31nfswAg80N5d4TKFhy8UG.pdf.

Federation Council. ” ЕЖЕГОДНЫЙ ДОКЛАД Временной комиссии Совета Федерации по защите государственного суверенитета и предотвращению вмешательства во внутренние дела Российской Федерации (15 июля, 2020 г.)”/ ANNUAL REPORT of the Interim Commission of the Federation Council for the Protection of State Sovereignty and Prevention of Interference in the Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (July 15, 2020).” Commission materials, July 15, 2020. Accessed March 14, 2023. http://council.gov.ru/media/files/y3YmN900m2cDIS8FGp2zlPcWuNalbigk.pdf.


Federation Council. ” ЕЖЕГОДНЫЙ ДОКЛАД временной комиссии совета федерации по защите государственного суверенитета и предотвращению вмешательства во внутренние дела российской федерации (15 декабря 2021 г.)”/ ANNUAL REPORT of the Interim Commission of the Federation Council for the Protection of State Sovereignty and Prevention of Interference in the Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (December 15, 2021).” Commission materials, December 15, 2021. Accessed March 14, 2023. http://council.gov.ru/media/files/45LAsYxq5VUg3oKAAQllyXpmrL7lu3gI.pdf.


Federation Council. “Отчет о деятельности Временной комиссии Совета Федерации по защите государственного суверенитета и предотвращению вмешательства во внутренние дела РФ в период с июня по декабрь 2017г.”/ “Report on the activities of the Interim Commission of the Federation Council for the protection of state sovereignty and the prevention of interference in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation in the period from June to December 2017.” Commission materials. December 25, 2017. Accessed March 25, 2023. http://council.gov.ru/structure/commissions/iccf_def/plans/88007/.


Inter-Parliamentary Union. “The role of parliament in preventing outside interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.” Standing Committee on Peace and International Security. December 21, 2016. Accessed March 14, 2023. http://archive.ipu.org/conf-e/136/1Cmt-dr.pdf.


Kanet, Roger E., and Dina Moulioukova. “Russia’s Self-Image as a Great Power.” In Russia and the World in the Putin Era: From Theory to Reality in Russian Global Strategy, 11–33. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2022.


Kinnvall, Catarina, and Jennifer Mitzen. “Anxiety, Fear, and Ontological Security in World Politics: Thinking with and Beyond Giddens.” International theory 12, no. 2 (2020): 240–256.

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